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LEGISLATION IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF
CONTRACTS.
THE tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the
United States prohibits the several states from passing any law
impairing the obligation of contracts. Like most of the clause,
of that instrument this limitation has had a cogent influence in the
decision of a long array of reported cases, and its operation has
been found to determine the validity of many different species of
legislation. It is the purpose of this article to examine in detail
the more important applications of the prohibition, in the light
of the authorities where its effect has been called in question and
decided.
I. Charters of _Private Corporations.-Sincethe decision in the
great case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, it
has scarcely ever been doubted that a charter of a private corporation is a contract, within the meaning of the constitutional
limitation, between the state and the corporators, and that any act
of legislation which impairs it, whether by enlarging the power
of the state over the body corporate, or by abridging its franchises,
or otherwise altering it -in a material point, is invalid. The case
cited held that the charter.granted by George III., to the trustees
of Dartmouth College in 1769 was a contract, and not subject to
alteration at the hands of the New Hampshire legislature. And
the same principle was upheld in the equally celebrated case
VOL. XXXIV.-
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of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87. And see Commercial Bank v.
State, 6 Sm. & M. 599; Attorney- General v. Bank of Charlotte,
4 Jones Eq. 287; per contra; State v. Railroad, 24 Texas 80;
Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 Ohio St. 622. As examples of legislative
interference with corporate rights may be cited Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aik. 264, where a statute authorizing certain persons to
pass over a turnpike road without paying toll, who were not exempt
by the act incorporating the turnpike company, was held unconstitutional ; and the case of Commonwealth v. NTew Bedford Bridge,
2 Gray 839,,where the charter of a bridge company authorized the
erection of a bridge "with two suitable draws which shall be at
least thirty feet wide," and it was held that a subsequent act requiring such draws to be of the width of sixty feet was invalid, as
annexing new conditions. But*a grant of a corporate franchise,
like any other contract, must be accepted by the grantee, in order
to raise any obligation. Hence a law declaring the repeal -of all
charters under which a bonafide organization has not taken pilace
and business been entered upon within the time limited by the
charter, or, if. none be specified, within a reasonable time, is not in
conflict with the constitution: Chincleclamouche Lumber Co. v.
Commonwealth, 100 Penn. St. 488; Gregory v. S-helby College, 2
Met. (Ky.) 589; Balto. & Susq. Rd. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 895.
It is axiomatic that every contract must. be founded upon a consideration, and the consideration in the case of a private charter is
of course understood to be the advantage which the public expects
to derive from it, whether of convenient transportation of persons
and property, or increased facilities in the circulation of money, or
reduced cost of manufactured articles, or what not. And even in
the case of a mere grant by the legislature, based on no consideration at all, if the grant has become completely executed it is thereafter, like a gift between individuals, irrevocable: .Derby Turnpike
Co. v. Parks,10 Conn. 522. Equally within the prohibition are
the rights and powers incidental to the corporation and proper and
necessary to carry into effect the authorities granted by its charter:
Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 801. At the same time, this
constitutional immunity cannot be carried so far as to exempt the
corporation from the proper and reasonable control of the state in
cases where its privileges have been perverted or abused- or the
rights of third persons are in danger of being compromised through
its actions. This position is very vigorously maintained by Mr.
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Justice HARLAN, in a case decided by the United States Supreme
Court in March 1885 (i.lMeaga Life Insurance-Co. v..Needles,
11I Mo S. 574. The learned judge says: "The- right of the
plaintiff in error to exist as a,corporation and7 its authority in that
capacity to conduct the particular business forwhich it was created,
were granted subject to the condition that the privileges and
franchises conferred upon it should not be abused, or so employed
as to defeat the ends for which it was established, and that, when
so abused or misemployed, they may be withdrawn or reclaimed by
the state in such way and by such nodes of procedure as are. consistent with law. Although no such condition is expressed. i' the
company's charter, it is necessarily implied in every grant of corporate existence : Bank of the Bepubli v. iamilton, 21 Il. 53;
Mobile, &a., Bd. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; Louisville, ft., 0o. v.
Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.) 165. So a law which gives a workman,
employed by a sub-contractor on a railroad, the right to recover
against the corporation, applies to, existing companies and is not
unconstitutional: Grannahanv. Railroad,30 Mo. 546.
Whenever a right to repeal, alter, or amend a charter is reserved
to the state in the- act of incorporation itself, its exercise will not
impair the obligation of the contract . Commonwealth v. Fayette
Co. Rd., 55 Penn. St. 452; Miners' Bank v. U. S, 1 Greene
(Iowa) 553 ; P'errin v. Oliver, 1 Minn. 202 ; In re Oliver Lee &
Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. Andcwhere several charters are contained
in one act, it is enough if the power of repeal be reserved in any
part of the same act, provided the language of theclause is sufficient
to embrace the whole act: Ferguson v. Bank, 3 Sneed 609f. Or
the power of revocation may be reserved in the state constitution,
and, in that event, need not be repeated in the charter: -Delaware
Bd. Co. v. Tharp, 5 Harr. (Del.) 454. Of course the legislature
is not prohibited from altering a charter, even in its most essential
features, if the changes are accepted and agreed to by the corporation: Ehrenzeller v. Union Canal Co., 1 Rawle 190 ; and the
assent of a corporation to legislative changes in its charter may be
inferred from such circumstances as would raise a similar presumption in the case of a natural person: Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13
Penn. St. 133.
H. .Municipal Corporatons.-The foregoing remarks are to be
applied solely to such corporations as are essentially private in their
nature. With regard to municipal bodies the rule is different.
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Their charters are not contracts; and they are not exempt, by
the constitution, from the control of the legislature, except in so
far as private property rights are ihvolved. In the language of the
Pennsylvania court : "There can be no doubt that the legislature
possesses the power to alter the charters of such public bodies as
concern the welfare and wholesomeness of the body politic; such
as concern the administration of government, and are emphatically
public. Such are the corporations of cities and boroughs, when
no private right of property is involved, except incidentally, and
such as can be easily reserved and coiipensated :" Brown v. Hummel, 6 Penn. St. 86; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 52: Bruffett v.
Railroad,25 Ill. 353 - Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 515.
The distinction is thus stated by a learned judge in Maine; "The
distinction between public and private corporations has reference
to their-powers and the purposes of their creation. They are public, when created for public purposes only, connected with the
administration of the government, and where the ' whole interests
and franchises are the exclusive property and domain of the government itself.' * * * All corporations invested with subordinate
powers, for public purposes, fall within this class, and are subject
to legislative control :" Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 417.
But it was held, in the same case, that where the charter of a town
grants to its trustees a fund for the use of its schools, the trustees
constitute, for that purpose, aprvate corporation, and a subsequent
statute, appropriatibg a part of that fund to the uses of another
town, is therefore unconstitutional. And indeed it is well settled
that when the state enters into an actual contract with a municipal
corporation, the subordinate relation ceases and gives- place to the
equality subsisting between all contracting parties : Groganv. San'
Francisco, 18 Cal. 590.

III. Grants of Exclusive Privileges.-Notwithstanding some
difference of opinion it may now be regarded as established law
that it is within the power of the legislature to grant to a corporation exclusive rights and privileges which no future legislature can
revoke or impair. The principal case on this point is that of The
Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, where it was held that a charter
to a bridge company to erect a bridge and take tolls, enacting that
thereafter it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to erect
any other bridge across the same stream within a distance of two
miles above or below the proposed bridge, constitutes a contract
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between the state and the corporation which is inviolable within theconstitutional prohibition; and that it means not only that no person shall erect such bridge without legislative authority, but that
the legislature will not make it lawful for any person to do so. And
see same point in Bridge- Co. v. Hoboken Land, &c., Co., 2 Beasley
(Y 3.) 81 ; Riscataqua Bridge v. New HanipshireBridge, 7 N.
H 35; Collin&v. Sherman, Rt Miss. 679; Trustees v. Aberdeen,
la Sm. & Mar. 645. But if the privileges granted to the corporation are not made exclusive by the clear and unmistakable language
of the act, the obligation of the contract,- is net considered as
impaired by a subsequent grant, by the legislature, of a similar franchise to another corporation, notwithstanding the use of the latter
may damage or even destroy the value of the first franchise or rival
and diminish its profits: Charles BiverBrdqev. Warren Bridge,
11 Pet. 420: Turnpike Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 210 ; ort -Plain
Bridge 0o. v. Smith, 9G N. Y. 44; Matter of Hamilton Ave., 14
Barb. 405. In other words, in a simple act of incorporation, not
conferring exclusive privileges, the legislature does not contract to
preserve the value of the franchise, but only that the franchiseitself shall not be taken away or materially altered. The rule of construction in such cases is, that the charter is to be construed strictly
against the grantee, and nothing is to be taken- by implication ; and
therefore the state will not be held to have fettered its hands, in
regard to granting rival franchises, unless such limitation is
expressed in the grant itself in plain and explicit terms: Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, supra; flartford Bridge Co. v.
Union Ferry 0o., 29 Conn. 210; 2 Washburn on Real Property,
29.6.
IV. .Fxemptionfrom Taxation.-It is also within the power of
the legislature to exempt the property of a corporation from all
future taxation, or from all assessment beyond a certain amount,
and such an engagement, if express and positive, constitutes an
irrevocable and inviolable contract under the federal constitutionThe leading case on the subject is that of The State of New Jersey
v. Wzison, 7 Cranch 164. It appeared that in 1758 the legislature
of New Jersey passed an act to give effect to an agreement made
by certain commissioners Vith the Delaware Indians, which agreement included the relinquishment by the Indians of their claim to
all lands within the colony, in consideration of the purchase for
them of a tract of land on which they might reside, and the act
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provided that such tract so purchased should not thereafter be subject to any tax. In 1801 the Indians sold the tract, with the consent of the legislature, and removed from the state. In 1804 the
legislature repealed that section of the act of 17'58 which exempted
the lands from taxation, assessed the lands, and demanded the tax
from the purchasers; whereupon this controversy arose. The
Supreme Court held that the proceedings between the colony and
the Indians constituted a contract, of which the exempting clause
was an integral part, and that therefore the repeal of that clause
violated the obligation of the contract, and was unconstitutional.
And see Gordon v. Appeal Tax Gourt, 3 How. 133; State Bank
of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Id. .39; Hardy v. Waltham, 7 Pick. 110;
People v. Roper, 85 X. Y. 633. Though this doctrine is generally agreed to, another line of cases introduces a limitation upon it,
viz.: that there must be a special consideration for the grant of an
extraordinary privilege, like that of exemption from taxation; that
if no bonus is paid by the corporation, no right surrendered to the
public, no service or duty or additional obligation imposed upon
the corporators as a consideration for it, it is a mere spontaneous

concession on the part of the legislature, and not properly a part of
the contract: Washington University v. Rowse, 42 Mo. 308; -People
v. Comm'rs of Taxes, 47 N. Y. 501; Hospital v. Philadelphia
County, 24 Penn. St. 229. Thus it is said in a New York case:
"It is never to be assumed, however, that the state has, even to this
extent, fettered its power in the future, except upon clear and
irresistible evidence that the engagement was in the nature of a
private contract, as distinguished from a mere act of general legislation, and that such, in the particular instance, was the actual and
deliberate intention of the state authorities :" People v- Roper, 35
N. Y. 633: And where the act of incorporation prescribes that no
other liabilities or obligations shall be imposed onthe corporation
than those contained in its charter, still the legislature does not
divest itself of the right to make further enactments as to the mode,
the time when, and the courts where, those liabilities and obligations
shall be enforced: Gowen v. Railroad,44 Me. 140.
V. Eminent Domain.-These questions concerning grants to
corporations are often complicated with the peculiar rights of the
state, growing out of the power of eminent domain. Whether the
legislature can, in any particular instance, by contract, divest the
people of the right of eminent domain, is a question propounded
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but not decided in the case of Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. II. 138;
but the court intimates a very strong opinion that this "-power is
inherent in the people, under a republican government, and so far
inalienable that no legislature can make a contract by which it shall
be surrendered without express authority for that purpose in the
constitution, or in some other way directly from the people themselves." But this case, even if it were a positive authority for the
position there indicated, is in direct conflict with the preponderance.
of judicial opinion. The authorities cited in the preceding section
conclusively establish that the right of taxation, at. least, may be
waived by the legislature, provided the intention to do so is manifested in unequivocal terms; and it is apprehended that, under the
coercive force of those rulings, the doctrine would be extended to
any similar questions which might arise. But here, also, the grant
is to be strictly construed against the corporators, and in favor of
the public, and "nothing passes hut what has been granted-in clear
and explicit terms, and neither the right of taxation, nor any other
power of sovereignty, will be held by this court to, have been surrendered, unless such surrender has been expressed in terms too
plain taobe mistaken :"
-effersom Bfank v. Skelly, I Black (U.
S.) 436. And it is important to be noted that the power of eminent domain, so far as concerns the right to take private property
for public uses, is never waived. The very franchise itself is only
a species of property (and not more sacred than any other kind),
and hence may be taken or destroyed by the state in the exercise
of its sovereign powers, as well as any other propertyof the citizen;
and when compensation is provided for its infringement, its obligation is not impaired, .ut recognised : Inre Twenty-Second Street,
102 Penn. St. 108; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19; Central
Bridge v. Lowell, 4 Gray 474 ; PiscataquaBridge v. N. H. Bridge,
T N. H. 85.
VI. Contracts of the State with Individual.-Passingfrom corporations and their privileges to natural persons, there can be no
doubt that states may contract with individual citizens, and that such
engagements, if authorized by law, are equally protected under the
egis of the constitution; so that rights acquired under them cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn or divested by subsequent legislation :
Woodruff v. State, 3 Pike 285. Thus a contract by the state to
convey lands on the performance of a condition precedent by the
grantee, creates an obligation to parties accepting and partly per-
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forming the condition which the legislature cannot evade by a
repeal of the granting act: Montgomery v. 'Kasson, 16 Cal. 189;
Stanmire v. Taylor, 3 Jones (N. C.) 207. So also, a statute providing for the funding of the floating debt of a city, amounts to a
trust agreement, upon valuable consideration', and is therefore substantially beyond the control of the legislature: Peoplev. Bond, 10
Cal. 563. So where a state chartered a bank, of which it was to
be the sole stockholder, and provided that the bills of such bank
should be receivable in payment of all debts due the state, it was
held (though by a divided court), that this constituted a contract
with the holders of such bills to receive the same in payment of state
dues, and that consequently that dlause could not be repealed as to
existing holders: Woodruff v. Traprnall, 10 How. 190. And in
a recent and highly important series of cases, (" The Virginia Coupon Oase8"), it has been held by the supreme federal tribunal that
when the State of Virginia, in funding the public debt in 1871,
agreed that the coupons attached to the new bonds should be receivable in payment of all -debts, taxes, and other demands due the state,
this raised a contract between the state and the coupon-holders, the
obligation of which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation
declaring that such coupons should not be taken in payment of state
taxes: Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672 ; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 Id. 769: Poindexter v. Green7how, 9 Va. Law Journal
331. But in respect to executory contracts, the state stands upon
the same footing as an individual. That is, while the grant or contract remains unexecuted, while it still requires some further act to
its completion, and while no consideration in fact or presumed exists,
it may be revoked or repudiated in the same way that a mere naked
promise between individuals may be recalled: Trustees v. Rider,
13 Conn. 87. And further, in the language of ANDREws, J.:
"The state may at any time abandon an enterprise which it has
undertaken, and refuse to allow the contractor to proceed, * * *
or enter into a new contract for its performance by other persons,
without reference to the contract previously made, and although
there has been no default on the part of the contractor. The state,
in the case supposed, would violate the contract, but the obligation
of the contract would not be impaired by the refusal of the state to
perform it. The original party would have a just claim against the
state for any damage sustained by him from the breach of the contract:
Lord v. Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107. Finally, a law giving permission
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to bring suits against the state is not a contract: Beers v. Arkansag, 20 How. 527.
VII. Tenure of .public Office and Compensation.-The constitutional limitation does not apply to the appointment or continuance in office, nor to the compensation, of the public officers of the
state or municipality, unless provided for in the constitution of the
state. Such engagements are not considered as contracts. Their
compensation may be increased or diminished, or their terms of
office closed, at the will of the legislature, subject only to the state
constitution: Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Benford v.
Gibson, 15 Ala. 521; State v. Sme8es, 26 Miss. 47 ; Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 822; People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 278;
Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Penn. St. 49. Thus it is said, in Barker
v. Pittsburgh,"that there is no contract, express or implied, for
the permanence of a salary, is shown by the constitutional provision
for the permanence of the salaries of the governor and judges as
exceptions." And even where an, office is created by the constitution and defined as to the term and salary, still the people may, by
the adoption of a new constitution, terminate both without regard
to the interests or expectations of the incumbent: Conner v. New
York, 2 Sandf. 355; Coffin v. State, 7 Ind. 157.
VIII. Contracts betweem Individuals.-The first and most obvious application of the clause we are considering is to contracts
between private individuals ; yet not many cases have arisen on
this point, and those must be reviewed rather as examples of the
general principle than as establishing broad rules of application.
Thus, a law changing the rate of interest on existing debts, though
not falling due till after its date, impairs the obligation of contracts and is unconstitutional: Myrick v. Battle, 5 Fla. 845
Brewer v. Otoe, I Nebr. 373; Roberts v. Cocke, 28 .(ratt. 207.
So where a law makes the stock of stockholders in a corporation
liable for its debts, it cannot be repealed as to existing debts, for
that would impair the contract of the creditors with the bank:
Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10; but oh the other hand, there
being no privity of contract between creditors of corporations and
the individual stockholders, the latter are personallyliable (if at all)
only by express statutory provisions, not by contract, and hence
the repeal of a law declaring their individual liability does not
impair the obligation of any contract : Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507.
So an enactment that indorsers in blank of promissory notes before
VOL. XXXIV.-12
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delivery, &c., shall be entitled to notice of non-payment the same
as regular indorsers, cannot apply to existing notes, for it would
materially alter the contract relations of the parties : Cook v. Googins, 126 Mass. 410. But a law prohibiting the future making of
contracts of a specified kind is not within the purview of the limitation : Churchman v. llartin,54 Ind. 880; nor is a law which
makes valid a void contract: Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 150.
Nor was the constitutional prohibition intended to interfere with
the legislation of the states in regard to their internal police. Hence
a law declaring a certain day to be a legal holiday cannot be regarded
as impairing the obligation of the contract contained in a promissory note, already existing, although its effect is to make such note
payable one day earlier than it would otherwise have been: Barlow
v. Gregory, 31 Conn. 261. Nor can a law which is in force at the
time a contract is made be deemed to have this effect; for the
parties are legally conusant of it, the contract is made with reference
to it, and it is embodied in their agreement: Blanchard v. lus8ell,
18 Mass. 16. Neither can the limitation be extended to judicial
decisions which declare a contract void because it contravenes the
constitution : McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa 243. Finally, it is competent only for the party whose rights are invaded to plead the nullity of a law as impairing the obligation of contracts: New Orleans
Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 364.
IX. State Insolvent Laws.--It is settled that a state insolvent
law, allowing the absolution of the debtor, is not uiconstitutional
as impairing the obligation of contracts, provided that it is not
extended to pre-existing debts, but only to such as were contracted
after the law went into effect, and provided that it shall only apply
to citizens of the state and to such others as voluntarily place themselves within its control and jurisdiction for that particular purpose:
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Baldwin v. Hale, 1
Wall 223; 1 Kent's Com. *422 And whereas this principle
was at one time made to rest upon the ground that parties contracted with reference to existing insolvent laws and so made them
a part of their contract, that theory seems to be rejected by the
more recent cases, and an entirely different basis established: In
the language of Judge GARDINER: "The permission by these laws
accorded to a debtor to absolve himself is an act of sovereignty,
induced by considerations of public expediency. It is the exercise
of a power not derived from or dependent upon contract, but beyond
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and in hostility to it. The public good or the exigencies of &state
may require the taking of private property without the consent of
the owner, or the discharge of a debt without the consent of thecreditor; but the idea, that the justification in either case rests on
contract or depends upon the assent of the holder, has scarcely the
merit of plausibility :" Donnelly v. Corbett, S Seld. 505.
Nothing can be more firmly established, however, than that a
discharge of the debtor under the insolvent laws of his own state
has no effect whatever upon contracts made with citizens of other
states, or upon contracts not made within the state : Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Bale, 1 Wall. 223; Pelch -v.
Bugbee, 48 Me. 9; Guernsey v. Wood, 130 Mass. 503 ; Whitney
v. Whiting, 35 N. II. 467 ; Prattv. Chase, 44 N. Y. 597'; Story
on Confl. Laws, § 341. And in Guernsey v. W-ood, supra, this
principle was held to apply though the contract was made and to be
performed in the state of the defendant, and even though made by
the defendant with plaintiffs agent who was also a resident of that
state and whom defendant supposed to he the principal, the fact of
agency not being disclosed. These decisions proceed upon two well
known and analogous rules of law; (1) that state laws have no
extra-territorial force, (2) that the courts of a state have, generally,
no jurisdiction over non-residents. It is therefore entirely in
accordance with this principle to hold that foreign creditors may
put themselves on a footing with citizens, and be equally bound by
the debtor's discharge, by becoming parties to the, proceedings, by
proving their debts under the commission of insolvency, by accepting dividends, or by any other act which clearly shows their submission to the jurisdiction : Whitney v. Whiting, 35 N. I. 467 ;
Prattv. Chase, 44 N. Y. 597. But if the contract is made between
citizens of the same state, the power to grant a discharge is not
impaired by a subsequent removal of the creditor to another state:
Stoddard v. Hfarrington, 100 Mass. 87.
X. Marriage not a Contract.-The constitutionality of legislative divorces has involved, the question how far and to what purposes marriage may be considered a contract. A few sporadic cases
have held that it is purely and simply a contract, and therefore
within the constitutional limitation now under consideration; Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23; Bryson v. Bryson, 44 Mo. 232. But
the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that, while
certain contractual elements do indeed enter into the marriage rela-
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tion, it is more properly to be regarded as a status; and therefore
an act of the legislature destroying the marital status of two persons is not a "law impairing the obligation of contracts :" Maguire
v. 3faguire, 7 Dana 183 ; Adams v. Palmer,51 Me. 481 ; Cronise
v. Cronise, 54 Penn. St. 255; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 849;
Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; Story on Confl. Laws, § 108 and note;
2 Whart. on Cont. § 1069; 1 Bishop Mar. & Div. §§ 667, 669.
XL Not Applicable to Actions on Torts.-It seems to be well
settled that a claim founded upon a tort, whether it has passed into
judgment or not, cannot be considered a contract under this clause
of the federal constitution ; because in either case, it lacks one of
the vital elements of a contract, the assent of the parties; McAfee
v. Covington (Sup. Ct. of Ga., 1884), 17 Reporter 552 ; Garrison
v. New York, 21 Wall. 196; 2 Wharton on Cont. § 1070, and
case cited.
XII. Distinction between Obligation and _emedy.-Of all the
complications which have arisen under the general topic, and presented themselves for solution, there is perhaps none which has been
productive of greater embarrassment and confusion than the distinction between the obligation of the contract and the remedy for its
enforcement.
We propose first to review the authorities which
have taken this troublesome question in hand, and then to see what
deductions can be drawn from them. In the first place, then, the
obligation of a contract may be roughly defined as the duty of each
of the contracting parties to perform his share of it, and the right
(since right and duty are here correlative terms), of the party who
keeps the agreement to exact specific performance, or compensation
indamages, from the party who breaks it. The remedy is the means
provided by the state for the enforcement of that right.. Accordingly it was said at an early day, by Chief Justice MARSHALL:
"The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been
taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be
modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct :" iSturges v.Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200. Then followed the case of Bronson v.
Kinzie, 1 How. 311, where the court said: "And although a new
remedy may be deemed less convenient than the old one, and may
in some degree render the collection of debts more tardy and difficult, yet it will not follow that the law is unconstitutional. What-
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ever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the
will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on- the remedy or directly on the
contract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the constitution.'"
Soon after it was held that a certain law in regard to sales of property on execution so far obstructed the remedy as to impair the
contract, and was therefore unconstitutional : McCracken v..Bayward, 2 How. 608. And see Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 6-10;
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575;
Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301. In the case of VTan Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, it was stated that if these doctrines
were stillopen to discussion, the soundness of the distinction between
obligation and remedy, might well be doubted. And a recent case
(BEdwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595), holds that the law of the
remedy, as it exists at the making of the contract, enters into it and
forms a part of its obligation, in so far that any subsequent change
of remedy which tends to essentially lessen or impair the value of
the contract, is unconstitutional. Turning now to the state reports
we find a number of cases holding generally that whatever pertains
to the remedy merely may be altered at the will of the legislature,
provided a substantive remedy is left to the creditor, and no material rights are destroyed: Rathbone v. Bradford, 1 Ala. 312;
Paschalv. Perez, 7 Texas 348; Holland v. Dickerson, 41 Iowa
367; Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 350. Again, it is held that a law
changing the remedy and rendering it less speedy and convenient,
is not invalid, if there be still a substantial remedy left: James v.
Stull, 9 Barb. 482. But if the law imposes so many obstacles in
the way of enforcing a class of contracts as to leave the right
scarcely worth pursuing, it impairs their obligation: Oatman v.
Bond, 15 Wis. 20; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524. And so a statute
which takes away all remedy is clearly unconstitutional: Bruce v.
Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 221; State v. Bank of the State, 1 S. 0. 63.
Another decision states that although the legislature cannot substitute a nugatory remedy for a good one, they can substitute another
good one; parties have a vested right to some remedy substantially
as good as the old one, but not to that particular one: Lockett v. Usry, 28 Ga. 345. Again, it is said that there is a distinction in favor of the constitutionality of an act which prolongs
or revives a remedy, as compared with one which cuts off or takes

LEGISLATION IMPAIRMG

away the remedy: aperton y. ilartin,4 West Va. 138. And
whereas it is sometimes suggested that the contractr is made with
reference to all laws existing at the time, a Minnesota decision holds
that only such laws become a part of the contract as would be enforced by courts of a foreign jurisdiction-such as have the full
force of law wherever the contract is sought to be enforced-which
of course excludes purely remedial legislation : Heyward v. Judd,
4 Minn. 483. And lastly, it is said that in determining whether a
change in the remedy is reasonable and just, the courts must look
behind the statute to the state of the country, and the causes which
led' to the enactment of the new remedy: Baumbach v. Bade, 9
Wis. 559.
It will have become apparent from the foregoing review that, notwithstanding some fluctuation of opinion, the United States courts
(and, under their lead, the state courts,) have been led to the adoption
of two positions not reconcilable without a compromise. First,
that whatever pertains merely to the remedy is no part of the contract and may be modified at the will of the legislature. Second,
that it is possible to alter the remedy in such a manner as to impair
the obligation of the contract itself. As a resultant of these two
positions, they have made the rule to rest on the extent to which the
change in the law affects the remedy and, through it, the contract;
holding that when the law destroys the-remedy altogether, or renders it practically worthless, or invades it in a material point, or
lessens the value of the contract, it is in contravention of the constitution. Although this has been repeatedly characterized as an
"unhappy" distinction, it is, after all, the only possible means of
escape from holding, on the one hand, that the remedy cannot be
modified at all, or on the other hand, that it may be desiccated or
destroyed. But that it opens up a very wide ground of debate will
be sufficiently apparent from the following section.
Before proceeding further, however, it is important to be observed
that if the parties to a contract include in it, in express terms, the
remedy for its enforcement, subsequent legislation .changing the
remedial process which they have agreed upon is, as to them, inoperative. "If they do not prescribe the rule of remedy in their contract, the law-making power is free; but if they do, they become a
law to themselves, and the legislature must let them alone :" Bill
meyer v. Evans, 40 Penn. St. 324; Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt.
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244; Duerson v. Alsop, 27 Id. 230; 2 Daniel on Neg. Instr
S970 a.
XIII. Examples.-Taking the conclusions arrived at in the last
section, therefore, as correctly expositive of the present state of the
law, we proceed to adduce some examples and illustrations, for the
purpose of showing in what cases the courts have held changes in
remedial legislation so material as to impair the obligation of the
contracts affected hy them, and where not. And in-the first place,
it is competent for the legislature to pass statutes of limitation,prescribing the time within which actions shall be brought on demands
already accrued, provided the time is not so unreasonably shortened
as to practically deprive parties of their remedy altogether: Griffin
v. ZcKenzie, 7 Ga. 163; Cox v. Berry, 13 Id. 806 ; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430; Holcombe v. Tracy, 2 Minn. 241 ; Maltby v.
Cooper, 1 Morris (Iowa) 59; Pearce v. Patton, T B. Mon. 162;
Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1. But where such a statute allows only
thirty days for the commencement of suits on existing debts, it must
be regarded as unconstitutional; because that time is unreasonably and oppressively short: BerTy v. BAansdall, 4 MNet. (Ky.) 292.
And where property rights have been acquired by virtue of a limiting act, they cannot be divested by a subsequent statute enlarging
the time for bringing suit: Sprecker v. Wakeley, 1 L Wis. 432. So
also it is allowable for the legislature to grant a stay of execution
on judgments, or otherwise postpone the collection of debts, so it
be for a limited and not unduly protracted period: Farnsworth v.
Vance, 2 Cold. 108; United States v. Conway, 1 Hempst. 313;
Chadwick v. .loore, 8 W. & S. 50; Coxe's Ex'r v. M"fartin, 44
Penn. St. 322; -Newkirk v. Chapron, 17 Ill. 344. But where the
provisions of the act are such that the stay taken under it may be
indefinitely, even perpetually, extended, it touches the remedy in a
vital point and is unconstitutional: Bunn v. Gorgas, 41 Penn. St.
441. As to whether exemption laws could apply to judgments
entered before their passage, there has been some difference of
opinion. It has been held that a law which prohibits a levy on a
portion of the debtor's property which was previously subject to an
existing judgment is unconstitutional: Borsyth v. Marbury, R. M.
Charlt. 824; Vedder v. Atlkenbrack, 6 Barb. 327 ; Quackenbush
v. Danks, 1 Denio 128. The last named case was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals in Danks v. Quackenbush, 1 Comst.
129 ; but as the opinion there was given by an equally divided court,
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it was not considered as entitled to the weight of a precedent ; and
the same court, in a later case (Aforse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281),
arrived at an exactly opposite opinion, conceiving that although a
law may be regarded as impairing the obligation of the contract when
it so embarrasses the remedy as to substantially defeat the rights
of the creditor, yet a statute exempting certain property would not
be likely to have that effect in the large mass of instances, though
isolated cases might occur where the exempted articles would
And this decision
constitute the debtor's whole property.
may be regarded as'sound law: Coriell v. Ham, 4 Greene
(Iowa) 455; Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119; Taylor v.
Stockwell, 66 Ind..505. But see Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.
Again, it is universally held that laws albolishing imprisonment for
debt do not touch the obligation of the contract: Sturges v.(rowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200; Gray v. Mlunroe, 1 McLean 528; Newton v. Tibbatts, 2 Eng. 150; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. 88;
Ware v. Miller; 9 S. 0. 13. Nor is there any constitutional objection to the repeal of an extraordinary remedy given to a particular
class of creditors by a previous statute: Stocking v. Runt, 3 Denio
274. So the legislature may change the remedies provided for the
collection of rents, e. g., by abolishing distress and substituting the
action of ejectment in its stead: JVan Rensselear v. Snyder, 13 N.
Y. 299. So also of statutes regulating the joinder of parties in suits
on negotiables: HMillan v. Sprague, 4 How. (Miss.) 647; Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507. Nor can a right be said to
be impaired by a statute which merely imposes an additional duty
on the owner, as necessary to its preservation: Taryley v. Hamer,
9 Sm. & Mar. 310; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68. Again, a
law prescribing that no action shall be maintained on any special
promise to pay a debt from which the debtor has been discharged
under the bankrupt law or state insolvent law, unless such promise
be in writing and signed by the debtor, has been held constitutional
and valid as applied to pre-existing verbal promises, the court saying : " The act * * * simply gives a rule of evidence as to the
proof of a new promise to revive the old debt : or, in other words,
declares that the law will furnish no remedy to enforce such a promise, unless it is in writing. The law has relation to the remedy
and not to the validity of the contract:" Kingley v. Cousins, 47
Me. 91. And generally, a law which establishes a rule of evidence
as to certain past transactions, cannot be regarded as within the pro-

